An algorithm to detect packet forwarding misbehavior in mobile Ad-Hoc networks by Gonzalez, OF et al.
An Algorithm to Detect Packet Forwarding
Misbehavior in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Oscar F. Gonzalez, Michael Howarth, George Pavlou
Center for Communications Systems Research
University of Surrey
Guildford, UK
Abstract-Devices in a Mobile Ad Hoc network (MANET) may
misbehave by dropping packets that are forwarded in the
network, for example because they are malicious and deliberately
intend to disrupt the network, or because they are selfish and
wish to conserve their own limited resources such as power. In
this paper, we present a mechanism that enables the detection of
nodes that exhibit packet forwarding misbehavior. We present
initial evaluation results that demonstrate the operation of our
algorithm and show that it effectively detects nodes that drop a
significant fraction of packets.
Keywords-mobile ad hoc network, misbehavior detection,
packetforwarding.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wireless nature and inherent features of mobile ad hoc
networks make them vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks by
misbehaving nodes. Such attacks range from passive
eavesdropping, where a node tries to obtain unauthorized
access to data destined for another node, to active interference
where malicious nodes hinder network performance by not
obeying globally acceptable rules. Misbehavior can be divided
into two categories [1]: routing misbehavior (failure to behave
in accordance with a routing protocol) and packet forwarding
misbehavior (failure to correctly forward data packets in
accordance with a data transfer protocol). In this paper we
focus on the latter type of misbehavior. Our approach consists
of an algorithm that enables packet forwarding misbehavior
detection through the principle offlow conservation [3]. Our
scheme is not tightly coupled to any specific routing protocol
and, therefore, it can operate regardless of the routing strategy
adopted. Our criterion for judging a node is the estimated
percentage of packets dropped, which is compared against a
pre-established misbehavior threshold. Any node dropping
packets in excess of this threshold is deemed a misbehaving
node while those below the threshold are considered to be
correctly behaving.
In this paper we first present a framework and an algorithm
and protocol that deal with this attack. We then demonstrate
through simulations that an appropriate selection of the
misbehavior threshold allows for a good discrimination
between misbehaved and well-behaved nodes in a network that
is affected by black hole attacks, where malicious nodes drop
all packets they receive, and/or gray hole attacks, where they
drop packets selectively or in a probabilistic manner in an
attempt to circumvent the security measures in place.
Section II of this paper describes our algorithm for packet
forwarding misbehavior detection, and Section III presents an
initial performance evaluation. Finally, the paper is
summarized in Section IV.
II. DETECTING PACKET FORWARDING MISBEHAVIOR
Our work provides a novel approach to securing the data
forwarding functionality in mobile ad hoc networks. We
propose an approach that takes advantage of the principle of
flow conservation in a network. This states that all
bytes/packets sent to a node, and not destined for that node, are
expected to exit the node. In this Section we first present, from
a theoretical point of view, how this principle works assuming
it is implemented in an ideal network, and then we demonstrate
that by making some reasonable assumptions and adaptations,
our algorithm can cope with the practical problems that are
encountered in real M\ANETs.
A. The Principle ofFlow Conservation
We formally introduce the principle of flow conservation
over an ideal static network model:
* Let v; be a node such that vj E V, whereVF= tV1, V2, V3 ...
VN} is the set of all nodes in the network, N is the total
number ofnodes in the network, andj= 1, 2, 3 ... N.
* Let Uj be the subset of nodes in the network which are
neighbors of vj, i.e. Uj is the neighborhood of vj. It follows
that v; 0 U) and also U) c V.
* Let At be the period oftime elapsed between two points in
time to and t1 such that At = t1 - to.
* Let Tij be the number of packets that node vi has
successfully sent to node vj for vj to forward to a further
node; vi E Uj, vj E Ui, i.j and Tij(to) = 0.
* Let Rij be the number of packets that node vi has
successfully received from node vj that did not originate at
v,; vi E U,, v; E Ui, i -,zj and R,,(to) = 0.
If all nodes vj E V remain static for a period of time At
during which no collisions occur in any of the transmissions
over an ideal (noiseless) wireless channel, then for a node vj:
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(1)iR,J(tl)= ViT
VilviE=Uj VilviE=Uj
This equation states the fundamental premise of the flow
conservation principle in an ideal static network, and is applied
to packets rather than individual bytes. It states that if all
neighbors of a node v; are queried for i) the amount of packets
sent to v; to forward and ii) the amount ofpackets forwarded by
vj to them, the total amount of packets sent to and received
from v; must be equal.
In practice M\ANETs exhibit conditions that are far from
ideal. First of all, the wireless channel is error prone and
packets get lost while in transit. Secondly, collisions happen
when the network uses protocols where nodes have to compete
for the medium, such as when the link layer protocol is based
on the distributed coordination function (contention period) of
the IEEE 802.11 a/b standard. In order to allow equation (1) to
hold our algorithm requires the use of a reliable M\AC protocol
such as IEEE 802.11, M\ACA [4] or M\ACAW [5], and the rest
of this paper assumes that such a reliable MIAC protocol is
used.
A reliable M\AC protocol at the link layer acknowledges
each successfully transmitted packet and thus transmitter and
receiver can maintain synchronized values of their metrics Tij
and Ri1. The use of a reliable MAC protocol in conjunction with
the conservation of flow principle means that we are not
susceptible to problems that arise when overhearing other
nodes' transmissions. Thus, problems such as ambiguous
collisions, receiver collisions, and the ability of a node to
control its transmission power, which affect the approaches
proposed in [1] and [2], do not exist in our approach.
Ambiguous collisions occur when a node v1 is trying to
determine if another node v2 is properly forwarding a packet. It
may happen that node v2 forwards the packet to a further node
V3, which is out of the transmission range of vl, while a second
transmission prevents v1 from overhearing the forwarded
packet, thus v1 will not know if the packet was forwarded. On
the other hand, in the receiver collision problem v2 forwards
the packet to V3 at which point a collision occurs. Node v1 is
unaware of such a collision and assumes that the packet was
forwarded even if v2 does not attempt a retransmission.
Another common problem is caused by nodes capable of
controlling their transmission power. Thus, v2 can transmit with
enough power for v1to overhear but not enough power for V3 to
receive it, leaving v2 unaware of the situation. All these
weaknesses, which can be used by malicious nodes to disrupt
the network, are due to the fact that overhearing is used by
nodes to check for misbehavior in other nodes. In our
algorithm the nodes that maintain statistics that are used to
determine whether the forwarding was properly made are the
nodes actively involved in the transmission process, i.e. the
transmitter and the receiver of each transmission.
However, a node may exhibit malicious behavior even if it
is not purposefully doing so. For example, an overloaded node
may temporarily lack the CPU cycles, buffer space or
bandwidth to forward packets [2]. In addition, some reactive
routing protocols, e.g. AODV, cause buffered packets to be
dropped if they go through a path that is even temporarily
unavailable. For these reasons equation (1) cannot be applied in
a rigorous manner and a threshold needs to be established to
account for packets dropped by a node through no fault of its
own. Equation (2) reflects this change:
(2)(I -ahreshold ) E Ri )< Ei,b
VilviE=Ui VilviE=Ui
The Ct*hreshold factor can take values between 0 and 1 and as
we shall see plays an important role in the detection power of
our proposed algorithm, i.e. the capability of the algorithm to
detect misbehaving nodes. The lower athreshold iS the more likely
it is that our algorithm detects any malicious behavior.
However, it also means that the probability of a false detection
increases. A false detection occurs when the result of a single
evaluation of a node mistakenly determines that the node
appears to be misbehaving. Therefore, fine tuning is required to
reach a fair point in this tradeoff.
B. Algorithm
In MANETs the neighborhood U, of a node v; changes
dynamically over time, making it difficult to determine those
nodes that have transmitted or received packets to or from a
node vj. Our scheme overcomes this problem by means of a
limited broadcast that tracks down nodes that have been in
contact with node vj. The core parts of our algorithm are
detailed in the pseudocode shown in figure 1. A node vi
maintains a table with two metrics T,, and R11, which contains
an entry for each node vj to which vi has respectively
transmitted packets to or received packets from. Node vi
increments T,, on successful transmission of a packet to v; for v;
to forward to another node, and increments Rij on successful
receipt of a packet forwarded by vj that did not originate at vj.
All nodes in the network continuously monitor their
neighbors and update the list of those they have heard recently
(Fig. 1 .a). If the ID of an overheard node is not included in the
table of overheard nodes a new entry is created. Otherwise, the
existing entry is updated with a timestamp corresponding to the
time the node was last overheard. Upon the creation of a new
entry, a node schedules a task/event to check the behavior of
the node whose ID has been saved in the new entry. Nodes
randomly select a period of time between T , and Tmax to
schedule the behavior checking task. This random selection
seeks to reduce the possibility of two or more nodes starting a
behavior check on the same node at the same time, wasting
network bandwidth, battery energy and other network
resources.
When a scheduled task is triggered in node Vk to check vy's
behavior (Fig. 1.b), node Vk broadcasts a metrics request packet
(MREQ) with TTL = 1 in the IP header. An MREQ includes
the ID of the node emitting the request (SRC ID), the ID of the
node whose behavior is to be checked (CHIJK ID), an
MREQ_ID and a timestamp indicating the time at which the
task was triggered. The MREQID is used in the same way as
in some routing protocols which base their route discovery
phase on broadcasting. If a node sees an MREQ that has the
same MREQ_ID and SRC ID of a packet seen before, the
MREQ is dropped. This technique prevents flooding packets
from traversing a zone of the network more than once. The
timestamp, on the other hand, is used to resolve conflicts when
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two nodes start a behavior check on the same node at almost
the same time. In such cases, nodes can see which of the
packets corresponds to the earlier triggered task and disregard
the other. This does not require accurate synchronization of the
nodes' clocks; approximate synchronization is all that need be
assumed.
a. OVERHEARING
ifnode Vk overhears a node vj E Uk
ifnode vj is not in Vk 's table ofoverheard nodes
. add node vj to Vk 's table ofoverheard nodes
. schedule an event to check vj's behavior
. else
. update last time node vj was heard
. endif
endif
b. INITIATE BEHAVIOR CHECK
if in node Vk an event to check node vj's behavior is triggered
* send a metrics requestpacket (MREQ) with node vj 's ID
* schedule another event to check vj's behavior again at t+Tmax
endif
c. REQUEST HANDLING
ifnode Vk receives a metrics requestfor node vj
ifnode Vk has node vj in its table ofoverheard nodes
. rebroadcast metrics request packet (MREQ)
. reschedule any event to check vj's behavior
i.fnode Vk has metricsfor node vj
. . send a metrics reply (MREP) back to the requesting node
. . endif
. else
. ignore request
. endif
endif
d. REPLY HANDLING
ifa request was sent out
-while there are more replies to be receivedfor node vj
. receive reply
. add received metrics to totals
. endwhile
broadcast of the MREQ is to go, instead of leaving this task to
the IP protocol. Thus, every MREQ travels only one hop at a
time, and is then analyzed and rebroadcast if the protocol so
determines. By following this algorithm, our protocol is
capable of tracking down nodes that have been in contact with
the checked node, as illustrated in Figure 2. We assume
transmissions can be overheard by vertically, horizontally and
diagonally adjacent nodes. In the Figure, node V7 iS first in
position a where it can be overheard by nodes v1, V2, V3, V6, V8,
VI], V12 and v13. Each of these nodes makes an entry in their
table of overheard nodes when V7 first transmits and each of
them schedules a task to check its behavior. At some point in
time, V7 decides to move following the path depicted in Figure
2 coming in contact with nodes v14, v17, v18, v19, v20, v23, v24 and
v25. It finally stops in position b. In the Figure the scheduled
behavior check initiation task (Fig. l.b) in v8 is the first to be
triggered and the limited broadcast commences. All nodes that
have overheard node V7 re-broadcast the MIREQ, whereas
nodes such as v4, vg and v15 also receive the MIREQ but ignore
it because they have not overheard node V7.
rq 'I ":4
0~~~~"
115
I,
JI7
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(D
O Nodes hzat have overheaid v7 V Nodes hzat have not overheaid v7
| Analyzednode v7 - Node's route LizitedMREQ broadcast
if ZR< aXhhld ZE1
VivjE=iU ViVEU
node vj is misbehaving (detection)
else
node vj is not misbehaving (non-detection)
endif
endif
Figure 1. Our algorithm pseudocode.
The handling of requests (Fig. l.c) is the heart of our
limited broadcast algorithm. When a node receives an MREQ it
first checks ifthe CHK ID is in its table of overheard nodes; if
it is not the node ignores the MREQ and discards the check.
However, if the CHK ID appears in its table then it
rebroadcasts the MREQ with TTL = 1 in the IP header. Setting
the TTL to one allows our algorithm to control how far the
Figure 2. Example of limited broadcast to track down nodes that have
overheard node V7.
Once a node has decided whether to continue or not
broadcasting a MREQ, it reschedules any pending task to
check the behavior of the checked node specified in the
CHK ID field of the MREQ. The new behavior checking task
is scheduled in the same way as when a new entry is made in
the table of overheard nodes, i.e. a period of time is randomly
selected between T and Tmax. In this way if the random
selection is uniformly distributed and the average frequency
with which an active node's behavior is checked is:
2
avg freq (
- (Tmin + Tnma, ) /2 (Tnin + Tnmax )
(3)
The last step a node takes when it receives a MREQ is to
check if it has any metrics (Rij or Tij) relating to the node being
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checked. If any of the metrics has a value other than zero the
node returns a metrics reply packet (MIREP) (Fig. l.c)
containing the metrics, but if the value of both metrics is zero
then the node does not send back any response. In our scheme
the task of finding a route back to the node that originated the
MREQ has been left to the underlying routing protocol.
Reply handling is executed in the node that initiated the
MREQ. This node, v8 in Fig. 2, waits for a period of time in
order to give all nodes with metrics about the checked node the
opportunity of replying. When the time expires, the node
checks the behavior of the analyzed node by verifying that
equation (2) holds (Fig. l.d). If it does not, it flags the checked
node as a misbehaving one; this is a detection. Using a single
detection to accuse a node is not sufficient since such an
algorithm may lead to false accusations against correctly
behaving nodes. A scheme in which multiple detections by
different nodes are necessary to accuse a node is fairer to well-
behaved nodes, while keeping a high probability of correctly
accusing misbehaving nodes. Thus, a system whose goal is to
accuse misbehaving nodes, perhaps in order to punish them by
withdrawing their right to transmit on the network, could use
an approach similar to the distributed consensus mechanism
proposed in SCAN [1].
III. EVALUATION
We perform our simulations using the GloMoSim
simulation package. The results presented for each value are
the average of 5 simulation runs. Our simulation parameters
take the following values: i) The number of nodes in the
network is 20, ii) Nodes are placed over an area of 200 x 200
squared meters, iii) Nodes move according to the random
waypoint mobility model with a constant speed of 10ms-', iv)
The pause time takes a value that is exponentially distributed
with mean 30 seconds, v) the wireless transmission range of
every node is 100 meters, vi) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, vii)
the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 DCF, viii) the
underlying routing protocol is AODV, and ix) the total
simulation time for each scenario is 300 seconds. The network
was set-up with 25% of nodes misbehaving by not forwarding
all packets. Nodes check the behavior of active nodes within a
period chosen uniformly between 15 and 30 seconds, and keep
any overheard node in their tables for 60 seconds after the last
time they are heard. The principal metric in our tests is the
percentage of detections, which is assessed in terms of
misbehavior threshold.
We consider the precision of our misbehavior detection
algorithm in terms of the misbehavior threshold, which is the
parameter °Chreshold in equation (2), i.e. the maximum percentage
of packets that a node is allowed to drop without being
detected as a misbehaving node. In order to see properly the
effect of the misbehavior threshold on nodes, simulations were
carried out with nodes dropping packets with probabilities of
0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 700O while the misbehavior threshold
was varied from 00/ to 100%.
Figure 3 depicts the percentage of detections as a function
of the misbehavior threshold for nodes exhibiting different
probabilities of misbehavior. It can be inferred from the graph
that the criterion to select an adequate misbehavior threshold
depends on the level oftrust required in the network. The lower
the threshold is the more packets nodes need to forward to be
considered well-behaved. However, since characteristics
inherent to MANETs such as mobility and the noisy wireless
medium can cause some packets to be lost (including packets
of our own protocol), it also means that an increasing number
of correctly behaving nodes can be falsely detected as
misbehaving ones. Finally, it can also be seen from Fig. 3 that
selecting a misbehavior threshold equal to a node's
misbehaving probability prevents our approach from
identifying misbehaving nodes with certainty, i.e. the
probability of detection is approximately 50%. These
occurrences are all contained in the zone between 400/ and
60% probability of detection in the figure.
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Figure 3. Percentage of positive detections as a function of the increasing
misbehavior threshold (mean node speed= lOms-1).
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper we have presented an algorithm that is capable
of detecting packet forwarding misbehavior. The algorithm
does not require high density networks in which many nodes
can overhear each others' received and transmitted packets, but
instead uses statistics accumulated by each node as it transmits
to and receives data from its neighbors.
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